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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AN ESSAY ON FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND ADMIRALTY
ROBERT FORCE*
Today we characterize that part of substantive maritime law which is
derived from judicial decisions rather than legislation as “the general maritime
law.”1 As was noted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
general maritime law is probably the oldest body of federal common law.2
Underlying the theme of this session is the question, or perhaps, challenge: by
what authority do federal courts create substantive rules of maritime law?
Asked differently, why should maritime, or admiralty, law be any different
from other areas of private law where, in the absence of congressional
legislation, state law provides the substantive rule of law?
Several articles written by non-admiralty scholars have appeared in
respected law reviews, asserting that the bulk of what admiralty lawyers and
teachers refer to as the general maritime law is unconstitutional.3 Their
argument, stated in overly simplified terms, is that there is nothing in the
Constitution that delegates to the federal government the power to legislate
admiralty and maritime rules, except to the extent that such rules fall within the
expressly delegated powers of Congress, such as the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce under the commerce clause. In other words,
Congress may enact maritime legislation only by exercising powers expressly
delegated to it in Article I of the Constitution. The argument assumes that even
if Article III, the article of the Constitution which creates the judicial branch,
permits an inference of legislative authority from the grant of jurisdiction over
“admiralty or maritime cases,” that delegation of powers is conferred to the
legislative branch of the government. The power to legislate has been
purposefully vested in the branch of government directly accountable to the
people, not in a judiciary whose members are appointed for life. Furthermore,

*

Niels F. Johnsen Professor of Maritime Law and Director, Tulane Maritime Law Center.
The substance of this paper was presented to the Section on Maritime Law of the Association of
American Law Schools at its meeting in New Orleans in January 1999.
1. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-1 (2d ed. 1994).
2. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing In re Air
Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 828 (2d Cir. 1994)).
3. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999);
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1245, 1341-60 (1996), and authorities cited therein.
1367

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1368

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1367

the enactment of federal legislation inevitably implicates considerations of
federalism, especially when federal rules preempt state law in order to achieve
uniformity. The decision to formulate a federal rule displacing a state rule, so
the argument goes, should be made by the branch of government likely to be
most sensitive to the interests of the states. This analysis sets the stage for the
final step of the attack on the general maritime law, that because nothing in the
Constitution delegates to the federal judiciary the power to make substantive
rules, i.e., to legislate, the federal judiciary has no power to preempt state law.
The underlying theory behind this attack is simply that the general maritime
law, being nothing more than a form of federal common law, should not be an
exception to the rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.4 The objects of the
argument are to remove the law-making and preemptive effects of the general
maritime law and to “re-invest” the authority to establish maritime law in the
states.
This contention is not new. It has been debated among the justices of the
Supreme Court from the nation’s earliest times and has been rejected by the
Court for at least 150 years. For example, in 1857, competing philosophies
were expressed in Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia,5 a case in which a
majority of the Court agreed to the assertion of federal admiralty jurisdiction
over a collision on the Alabama River. The majority rejected the contention
that federal admiralty jurisdiction was absent because the waters were not tidal
waters and the collision occurred within the body of the county, that is, within
the state. In concluding that the lower federal court could exercise jurisdiction,
the Court acknowledged that it had abandoned the test of admiralty jurisdiction
used in England and substituted a “navigable waters” test for admiralty
jurisdiction. The new test was better suited to the geography of the United
States which, unlike England, has a great inland river system.
Justice McClean briefly expressed a pragmatic view in his concurring
opinion:
Antiquity has its charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks of
professional life; but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently
found in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs; and this is
especially the case in all systems of jurisprudence which are matured by the
progress of human knowledge. Whether it be common, chancery, or admiralty
law, we should be more instructed by studying its present adaptations to
human concerns, than to trace it back to its beginnings. Every one is more
interested and delighted to look upon the majestic and flowing river, than by
following its current upwards until it becomes lost in its mountain rivulets.6

4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5. 61 U.S. 296 (1857).
6. Id. at 307.
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A historical view was expressed in Justice Daniel’s dissenting opinion:
But the court, after having declared the correctness of the English rule and its
adoption here, go on to say, nevertheless, ‘that a definition which would at this
day limit public rivers to tide-water rivers is wholly inadmissible.’ And why?
Because the Constitution, either by express language or by necessary
implication, recognizes or looks to any change or enlargement in the principles
or the extent of admiralty jurisdiction? Oh, no! For no such reason as this. “But
we have now (say the court) thousands of miles of public navigable water,
including lakes and rivers, in which there is no tide.” Such is the argument of
the court, and, correctly interpreted, it amounts to this: The Constitution, which
at its adoption suited perfectly well the situation of the country, and which then
was unquestionably of supreme authority, we now adjudge to have become
unequal to the exigencies of the times; it must therefore be substituted by
something more efficient; and as the people, and the States, and the Federal
Legislature, are tardy or delinquent in making this substitution, the duty or the
credit of this beneficent work must be devolved upon the judiciary. It is said by
the court, “that there is certainly no reason for admiralty power over a public
tide-water, which does not apply with equal force to any other public waters
used for commercial purposes.” Let this proposition be admitted literally, it
would fall infinitely short of a demonstration, that because the Constitution,
adequate to every exigency when created, did not comprise predicaments not
then in existence or in contemplation, it can be stretched, by any application of
judicial torture, to cover any such exigency, either real or supposed.7

Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, and the cases on which it relied,
involved important issues. To some extent, the enlargement of federal
jurisdiction came at the expense of the state courts. Where admiralty
jurisdiction is present, suitors may bypass state courts and bring their actions in
federal court. Further, in state court, the right to a jury trial is preserved in
ordinary contract and tort cases. In admiralty, there is no right to a jury trial.
An expansive view of federal admiralty jurisdiction permits cases which
otherwise would be tried to a jury in state courts to be tried without a jury in
federal admiralty courts. The justices who opposed a broad view of federal
admiralty jurisdiction were deferential to state courts and protective of the right
to a jury trial. But they also knew that another important issue was stake.
Underlying the jurisdictional issue lay the question of whether federal judges
had the power to make rules of admiralty and maritime law that would apply to
actions arising in inland waters. If admiralty jurisdiction had been restricted to
events and transactions on the high seas and tidal waters, then all litigation
which arose out of events and transactions on the many rivers and lakes in the
United States would have been relegated to state courts (assuming the parties

7. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
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were not diverse), where disputes would have been resolved under state law.8
In a series of decisions including The Steamboat Magnolia, the majority of the
Supreme Court justices who extended admiralty jurisdiction also impliedly
extended the authority of the Court to formulate general rules of maritime law
applicable to disputes arising on all navigable waters of the United States,
including inland waters. With the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction came the
expansion of federal law, in the sense that rules of the general maritime law
would apply to a wider range of cases, including those of a more localized
nature.
This fact was not lost on the Court. As Justice Campbell dissenting in The
Steamboat Magnolia bemoaned:
In the court of admiralty the people have no place as jurors. A single judge,
deriving his appointment from an independent Government, administers in that
court a code which a Federal judge has described as ‘resting on the general
principles of maritime law, and that it is not competent to the States, by any
local legislation, to enlarge, to limit, or narrow it.’
If the principle of this decree is carried to its logical extent, all cases arising in
the transportation of property or persons from the towns and landing-places of
the different States, to other towns and landing-places, whether in or out of the
State; all cases of tort or damage arising in the navigation of the internal
waters, whether involving the security of persons or title to property, in either;
all cases of supply to those engaged in the navigation, not to enumerate others,
will be cognizable in the District Courts of the United States. If the dogma of
judges in regard to the system of laws to be administered prevails, then this
whole class of cases may be drawn ad aliud examen, and placed under the
dominion of a foreign code, whether they arise among citizens or others. The
States are deprived of the power to mould their own laws in respect of persons
and things within their limits, and which are appropriately subject to their
sovereignty. The right of the people to self-government is thus abridgedabridged to the precise extent, that a judge appointed by another Government
may impose a law, not sanctioned by the representatives or agents of the
people, upon the citizens of the State.9

What has transpired since those days. To put matters into perspective, I
propose to take a few moments to summarize some of the most important
sources of United States maritime law. Today, maritime law is a blend of
congressional legislation (some of which implements international

8. Congress itself had previously intervened by conferring “admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction” over the Great Lakes through the Great Lakes Act of 1845. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, 5
Stat. 726-727, c. 20 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1994)). See also The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
9. Jackson, 61 U.S. at 341 (citation omitted).
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conventions), the general maritime law, and state law.10 Let us examine
various areas of maritime law.
COMMERCIAL LAW
Congress has enacted at least five statutes that deal with maritime
commercial law. The Harter Act,11 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(“COGSA”)12 and the Pomerene Act13 distinctly apply variously ways to the
transportation of goods by water. None of these statutes contains a
comprehensive treatment of the subject matter. In fact, Harter and COGSA
were designed, more or less, to address specific problems in commercial
shipping. Where there is a dispute arising out of the carriage of goods and there
is no rule specified in these statutes, courts create rules of general maritime
law. Sometimes courts merely interpret or fill gaps, such as in devising a rule
to deal with application of the COGSA package limitation of liability to cargo
shipped in containers,14 or in determining the affect of a deviation on the
availability of COGSA defenses and limitation of liability.15 Sometimes courts
actually go beyond the bounds of legislation and formulate rules of general
maritime law, such as rules for determining the validity of Himalaya clauses16
or the effect to be given to the incorporation of COGSA in contracts not
otherwise subject to COGSA ex proprio vigore.17 Of course, there are some
cases not governed by congressional legislation where federal courts have
applied state law.18
In the commercial area, where contracts of carriage are not governed by
bills of lading, such as in voyage charter parties, none of the aforementioned
legislation applies as a matter of law, although the parties may incorporate all
or part of COGSA into their contract of carriage. In such cases, particularly

10. There are also occasional references to ancient law, custom, English law and the laws of
other countries. See SCHOENBAUM supra note 1, at § 3-1.
11. Harter Act, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (current version at 46 U. S.C. app. §§ 190-96
(1994)).
12. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (current version at 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-15 (1994)).
13. Pomerene Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 80101-16 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1991).
15. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 536 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff’d, 706 F.2d 80 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Grace Line, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974).
17. See, e.g., Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, Ltd. v. United Shipping Co., 643 F.2d 376 (5th
Cir. 1981).
18. See, e.g., Colgate Palmolive v. S/S Dart Canada, 724 F.2d 313, 315, 316 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984); All Pacific Trading, Inc. v. Vessel M/V Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d
1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993); O’Connell Machinery Co. v. M/V Americana, 797 F.2d 1130, 1137
(2d Cir. 1986); cf. Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 5 F.3d 734 (4th Cir.
1993).
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where goods are carried pursuant to charter parties, the controlling law is
invariably general maritime law. Contracts of affreightment often utilize
standardized forms containing standard language. Some forms are used worldwide or in particular trades, and the terms incorporated therein have developed
meanings that are familiar to owners, charterers, brokers and others in the
particular industry, as well as the courts.
The same may be said of other charter party agreements, demise and time
charters, which are not contracts of affreightment. The meaning of standard
terms in charter parties has become an important part of the general maritime
law. Chartering vessels is an international business generally conducted by
brokers located at various exchanges and often involves owners and charterers
of different nationalities. Even where a charter party involves only local
interests, i.e., the owner and charterer are both local, such as is common in the
charter of a barge to be used in river trade or in offshore activities in the Gulf
of Mexico, the parties may still rely on standard form contracts embracing
standard terms. The law applied in maritime commercial disputes, such as
those involving bills of lading and charter parties, may be characterized as
“transnational,” because the industry operates in a transnational mode.
There are other statutes that deal with commercial law. The Ship Mortgage
19
Act and the maritime liens provisions of that Act20 are two examples. The
Ship Mortgage Act is quite comprehensive but the liens provisions are not. The
latter deals only with liens for “necessaries” and not with tort or other liens. A
considerable amount of maritime lien law, therefore, is contained in the general
maritime law that has evolved over many years.
The general maritime law governs other maritime contracts. Since this
area is not composed of a set of comprehensive rules, it is not unusual for
courts to look to state law in the absence of federal precedent.21 Some contracts
which appear to have a maritime flavor are nonetheless subject exclusively to
state law. Thus, anomalies exist, the preeminent examples being that contracts
to build vessels, mortgages to finance the building of vessels, and contracts for
the sale of vessels have been held to be non-maritime contracts and are subject
to state law, whereas contracts to repair vessels and to charter vessels are
maritime contracts.22

19. Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-43 (1994).
20. 46 U.S.C. § 31341. (1994).
21. See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(citing the Uniform Commercial Code).
22. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 22-28
(2d ed. 1975).
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PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH
In the personal injury area, there is a similar pattern. Congress has enacted
the Jones Act,23 the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”),24 the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”),25 and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act,26 all of which create remedies available to
persons engaged in various aspects of maritime employment who are injured or
killed. The personal injury provisions in the Jones Act and section 905(b) of
the LHWCA typically create a right of action for negligence. These statutes,
however, neither define “negligence” nor enumerate the damages that can be
recovered. The Jones Act, by incorporation of FELA,27 does prescribe the
consequences of contributory negligence and assumption of risk; § 905(b) of
the LHWCA does not, nor does DOHSA. There are no statutory provisions
dealing with apportionment of fault in the context of joint tortfeasors,
indemnity, or contribution.
There is no substantive legislation that deals with injury or death of
passengers, save the provisions of DOHSA, which apply to all deaths on the
high seas. Otherwise, cases involving passengers are resolved according to the
general maritime law. There is no statute that applies to actions maintained by
the survivors of persons killed in state territorial waters, except under the Jones
Act and to a lesser extent under § 905(b) of the LHWCA.28 Existing law was
developed in the Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc.29 decision and later
expanded in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet30 and Miles v. Apex Marine.31
Initially, courts accorded to seamen the right to maintenance and cure.32
Likewise, federal admiralty courts have created the seaman’s right under the
general maritime law to an action for unseaworthiness, extending the remedy
to Sieracki seamen33 not covered by the LHWCA. The entire body of maritime
products liability law is judge-made.34 All of the rules relating to maritime
contribution and indemnity are contained in the general maritime law.
23. Jones Act, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915) (current version at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1994)).
24. Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (current version
at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-67 (1994)).
25. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-48 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
26. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1331-34 (1940) (repealed 1980).
27. Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
28. But see Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
29. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
30. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
31. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
32. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
33. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1946).
34. See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 859
(1986).
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While the position of state law in the maritime tort area may not be as
significant as in the realm of contract law, it is not necessarily irrelevant. In
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,35 the Supreme Court held that survivors of a
nonseafarer killed in state territorial waters may invoke state wrongful death
remedies.36 There have also been exceptional cases in which state law has
been used to supplement the general maritime law by providing additional state
remedies in personal injury cases.37 Finally, state law has been influential in
the development of the general maritime law, most recently in the newly
developing tort area of maritime products liability.
COLLISION
The United States has ratified the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (“COLREGS”),38 the Safety of Life at Sea Convention
(“SOLAS Convention”),39 including the recent International Safety
Management Code, as well as a number of other conventions designed to
promote safety at sea. But the United States has not ratified the Collision
Convention,40 which deals with damages in collision cases, nor has it enacted
comparable legislation. The entire law of collision, including the basis of
liability, defenses, damages, proof of fault, presumptions and causation, is a
product of the general maritime law, regardless of whether the collision occurs
on the high seas, state territorial waters, or on inland waters.41
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
The unique maritime right to limitation of liability has been established
and implemented by statute,42 and embellished by the Supplemental Rules of
Civil Procedure.43 Nonetheless, much of the law of limitation is judge-made
law.44
35. 516 U.S. 199.
36. Id. at 207.
37. Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634 (La. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
819 (1992). Cf. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (stating that courts
cannot supplement DOHSA); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (holding that no
state worker’s compensation exists for longshoremen).
38. International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601-08
(1994).
39. Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.R.S. No. 9700 (1974).
40. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect to
Collision Between Vessels, U.N. Regulation No. 134(a) (Brussels, September 23, 1910).
41. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 7; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 12.
42. See Limitation of Liability Act, ch. 43, §4, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (current version at 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Sections 190-96 are also familiarly known as
the Harter Act. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
43. Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F, 28 U.S.C. (1994).
44. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 10; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
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GENERAL AVERAGE
In contrast, the law of general average, although based in contract, is
viewed as part of the general maritime law. It is considered to be international
in scope, much the same as the law of charter parties.45
TOWAGE
The law of towage is derived from the general maritime law.46
PILOTAGE
The law of pilotage is a blend of both federal and state regulatory law. The
rules of liability, however, are found in the general maritime law.47
SALVAGE
48

Salvage law, that is, the rules applicable in pure salvage situations,
originally consisted of rules of the general maritime law. Subsequently, the
United States became a party to an international salvage convention.49 The
rules of contract salvage are contained in the general maritime law.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In the environmental area,50 there is substantial legislation not only on the
regulatory aspect, but also as to liability. The United States is a party to
numerous conventions that deal with the prevention of pollution. With regard
to oil pollution, however, Congress has expressly declined to preempt state
law.51
MARINE INSURANCE
As to marine insurance, there is no statutory scheme comparable to the
British Marine Insurance Act.52 After the decision in Wilburn Boat Co. v.

45. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 5; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 15.
46. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at 515-20; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch.
10.
47. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at 520-22; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch.
11.
48. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 8; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 14.
49. The United States became a party to the International Convention on Salvage of 1910.
This was superceded by the International Convention on Salvage of 1989. See Cong. Rec.
S15398, Oct. 29, 1991. See also the Salvage Act, ch. 268, 31, 37 Stat. 242 (1912).
50. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 16.
51. See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994 and Supp. III 1997); see generally,
Robert Force, Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution Cases: In Search of Concursus or
Procedural Alternatives to Concursus, 22 TUL. MAR. L.J. 331 (1998).
52. Marine Insurance Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 41 (Eng.).
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Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.,53 the law of marine insurance is a mixture of
the general maritime law and state law.54
MISCELLANEOUS
Finally, there is a considerable body of congressional legislation and
federal administrative regulation dealing with a variety of matters including the
specification of the duties and the delegation of regulatory authority to the
Coast Guard, registration of vessels, customs rules, licensing and protection of
seamen, etc.
This laborious exercise was not undertaken gratuitously but rather to
illustrate that the law presently applied to what may be characterized as
maritime activities in a broad sense represents a fairly elaborate scheme in
which federal statutes, the general maritime law, and state law provide the
substantive rules. Both federal and state courts play a significant role in
applying those rules and sometimes in formulating the rules. The present
situation is not a blueprint with a perfectly symmetrical or rational delineation
of rule-creating authority, but rather a borderless jigsaw puzzle with
overlapping areas of authority. The complexity of the law, however, does not
mean that maritime law is not a “single body” of law, or, despite prevailing
distinctions, that maritime law is not relatively uniform.
In reviewing the role of the general maritime law, one encounters similar
complexity. Contemporary Supreme Court decisions illustrate the point. At one
extreme, in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,55 the Court
quite simply, and without fanfare, created a new maritime tort of products
liability, as to which, federal law, rather than state law, will presumably be
applied. At the other extreme, the Yamaha56 court allowed the plaintiffs to
invoke state wrongful death remedies in a case where the decedent was killed
in state territorial waters. Likewise, in Miller v. American Dredging Co.,57 the
Court upheld the application of Louisiana’s forum non conveniens statute to a
case within admiralty jurisdiction. Using yet a different approach, the Court in
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,58 expanded the judicially-created Moragne59
wrongful death remedy to include the beneficiaries of seamen killed in
territorial waters as result of unseaworthy conditions. In deference to the Jones
Act and in the interest of uniformity, the Court refused to allow recovery for
loss of consortium. In its most recent decision, Dooley Korean Airlines Co.,
53. 348 U.S. 310, 321 (1955) (holding that in the absence of an established maritime rule,
state law should be applied).
54. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 2.
55. 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986).
56. 516 U.S. at 199.
57. 510 U.S. 443 (1992).
58. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
59. 398 U.S. 375, 389 (1970).
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Ltd.,60 the Court refused to exercise its power to create general maritime law
by declining to follow several courts of appeals in recognizing a “survival”
action as a complement to the Death on the High Seas Act.61 It concluded that
if Congress had wanted to provide a survival counterpart to DOHSA, it would
have done so. Therefore, it is difficult make sweeping statements about the
current Court’s views on the general maritime law. Nevertheless, in areas
where Congress has legislated, the present Court seems less willing to act as a
creator of general maritime law. It is also safe to say, based on the Court’s
decisions in Miller62 and Yamaha,63 that not all judicially-created general
maritime rules, whether substantive or procedural, necessarily preempt state
laws.64 Beyond these statements, one cannot divine much more from the
Court’s recent opinions. That the Supreme Court appears to act inconsistently
reveals the difficulty and complexity of the current debate and helps explain
why issues involving the creation of general maritime law by the Court and the
resultant preemption of state law have been continuously debated within the
Court itself.
As to the matter at hand, the case against the general maritime law is
premised on two considerations: lack of constitutional authority and
federalism. A broad interpretation of the scope of United States admiralty
jurisdiction, no doubt, has an impact on federalism. Not only does admiralty
jurisdiction open the federal courts to litigants who otherwise would be
relegated to state courts, but usually, although not invariably, it also implicates
the application of substantive federal admiralty law.65
When Congress enacts maritime legislation under the Commerce Clause or
some other express power, there is no question that conflicting state law must
yield to the Supremacy Clause. The same result ensues when courts put a
judicial “gloss” on congressional legislation, or fill gaps in federal legislation.
In the absence of legislative action, what is the status of the general maritime
law? The question is, in reality, two questions: (1) do federal courts have
constitutional authority to create substantive rules of maritime law?, and (2) if
so, should those substantive rules preempt inconsistent state law? I maintain
that the answer to the first question should be a resounding “Yes”; the answer
to the second should be “It depends.”
I start with the premise that not every controversy regarding “federal
common law” is susceptible of resolution by way of a single theory or formula.
60. 118 S. Ct. 1890, 1895 (1998).
61. See, e.g., Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984).
62. 506 U.S. 809 (1992).
63. 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
64. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545 (1995) (citing East
River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 864 (1986)). But see Yamaha, 516 U.S.
at 210 n.8, 216 n.14.
65. See Grubert, 513 U.S. at 545 (citing East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864).
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The language and the history of particular provisions in the Constitution are
important in trying to discover their meaning. It is submitted, however, that
practical realities of particular circumstances should be given some weight.
The latter statement is all the more cogent when the text of the Constitution, its
“legislative history,” and the objectives of the framers are unclear. Of course,
the mere fact that the present system has evolved does not mean that it is the
best system. A congressionally enacted, comprehensive maritime code may
well provide a better approach as some countries have concluded. But that is
not likely to occur. Moreover, merely because the system has evolved does not
presuppose that it is “constitutional” in the context of Erie v. Tompkins.66 On
the other hand, simply because Erie is now regarded as the correct approach in
diversity cases, does not necessarily signify that it should be the controlling
approach in admiralty cases, despite the ease with which the logic of Erie
might be applied to admiralty cases.
Notwithstanding the fact that the general maritime law has been
characterized as part of the federal common law, it is submitted that maritime
law, especially in light of the unprecedented grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction in Article III, is sufficiently unique so as to merit individual
analysis in determining whether it is a valid creature of federal judicial power.
What then is so special about the general maritime law? There are several
responses to this question.
1. The general maritime law is an invaluable legacy from the past. It
reflects an evolution from the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in
Article III of the Constitution to the present. The development of the general
maritime law as we know it should not be undermined by arguments that may
be intellectually appealing but that nevertheless completely ignore the law’s
historical development. The arguments for restricting the scope of the general
maritime law have been considered and rejected for nearly two centuries.
During that period, many Supreme Court justices have played a role in the
development of the general maritime law up to its present form. We should be
loathe to discount their collective experience and contributions. The Court that
decided Erie never extended its rationale, or its holding, to the general
maritime law. In fact, a subsequent Supreme Court decision expressly refused
to apply Erie to the general maritime law.67
2. It has been demonstrated that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution was intended and understood by the framers to
extend not only to matters involving relations with other countries and their
citizens, that is, those aspects of maritime law which are incidents of
sovereignty or which derive from international law, but that it also included

66. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953).
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ordinary private law cases, such as seamen’s wage claims.68 In the era
immediately following ratification of the Constitution, lawyers regarded
federal court as the appropriate venue in which to initiate admiralty and
maritime actions, including private law claims.69
3. Early cases indicate that private maritime law in the United States was
contemplated to be judge-made law, and that it was treated as a single, uniform
body of law regardless of whether cases were heard in federal or state court.70
Although the expanding scope of admiralty jurisdiction and the growing
complexity of maritime law have brought increasingly more “local” matters
before federal courts, this does not undermine the benefits, such as uniformity,
of a single system as compared to the pre-Erie dual system which existed in
diversity cases.
The very existence and the language of the “saving to suitors” clause71
supports this conclusion. The statute applies where there is jurisdictional
overlap between actions that could be brought as admiralty actions and those
that could be brought at law. The clause creates the option for plaintiffs to
bring their actions as either admiralty actions in federal court or as actions at
law either in a state court or in a federal court where diversity jurisdiction is
present. What the statute “saves,” however, is the jurisdictional capacity to
assert the claim in a common law action, which, effectuates the right to have a
jury adjudicate the dispute. The clause does not purport to contemplate the
application of different substantive rules depending on whether the action is
brought at law or in admiralty. Courts that have entertained cases pursuant to
the saving to suitors clause have applied the substantive rules of the general
maritime law, except in those limited instances where it has been deemed
68. See generally, Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law
Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Casto Federal Common Law
of Admiralty, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 316 (1999); William R. Casto, The Origin of Federal
Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 117
(1993). Casto asserts that the primary motive for enacting the admiralty jurisdiction clause was to
confer federal jurisdiction of public law matters, but also concludes:
The most that can be said is that the drafters and the ratifiers of the Constitution’s
admiralty clause knew that the clause’s general language encompassed private disputes
but gave little thought to the matter. This combination of knowledge and indifference
could be viewed as license for future generations to shape admiralty jurisdiction according
to future values and needs.
Id. at 156.
69. See Gutoff, supra note 68, at 383-87.
70. See David W. Robertson, 184 ADMIRALTY & FEDERALISM (1970); Jonathan M. Gutoff,
Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, to be
published in 61 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1)any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
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appropriate for state law to supplement or fill gaps in the general maritime
law.72
4. The grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III is sui generis. With the
exception of “federal question” jurisdiction and jurisdiction over certain land
disputes, all other bases for jurisdiction enumerated in Article III are premised
on the status of the litigants, rather than the substance of the dispute. Unlike
federal question jurisdiction, the scope of which is at least superficially
ascertainable from the text of the Constitution itself or the relevant treaty or
statute, there is no similar source for determining the substantive rule of law to
be applied in admiralty and maritime cases. Surely it was contemplated that
federal judges, in the absence of legislation, would find appropriate sources
and rules to apply in admiralty cases, just as their English and state
counterparts had done before them.73
5. Making admiralty law “federal law” promotes uniformity of the law.
Although many areas of law might benefit from uniformity, it is particularly
important in the maritime arena. First, there is an intimate relationship between
maritime transportation and interstate and foreign commerce. Second,
maritime law is often applied in situations involving relations between foreign
nations and their citizens and the United States and its citizens. Third, the goal
of uniformity in maritime matters is an international objective. This
differentiates maritime law from other areas of the federal common law. From
the earliest of times, judges recognized that maritime law had an international
dimension and that some rules were, in modern parlance, “transnational.” The
Comité Maritime Internationale and the various national maritime law
associations throughout the world, including the Maritime Law Association of
the United States, have been committed to achieving international uniformity
in many areas of private maritime law. Today, the body of maritime law
includes many international conventions; some have been subscribed to by the
United States, including measures addressing private law.
6. Necessity requires the manifestation of a general maritime law. What
rules would apply to matters outside the jurisdiction of any state? Although
numerous statutes provide rules of maritime law, there are gaps in existing
legislation, and important areas where there is no legislation at all.
If the Supreme Court applied the Erie rationale to the general maritime law
tomorrow, assuredly there would be chaos. By and large, there is a single or
unitary system of maritime law in the United States, although it is fraught with
complexities. The system is based primarily on federal statutory and general
maritime law and only to a limited extent on state law. If general maritime law
were to disappear overnight, there would be nothing to effectively replace it.
There is no state law regarding collision, charter parties, maritime liens,
72. See generally, Gutoff, supra note 70 and sources cited therein.
73. See Gutoff, supra note 68, at 378-80.
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general average, etc. Whose law would apply on the high seas? The evolution
of this system warrants a presumption of validity.
By contrast, the result in Erie was easy to assimilate. After Erie, in
diversity cases, where federal jurisdiction is based solely on the citizenship of
the parties, federal judges decide ordinary contract and tort cases according to
the state rules that would have been applied had they been brought in state
courts originally. Underlying the Erie decision is the notion that the
formulation of substantive rules to be applied in diversity cases was a matter
reserved to the states. Except to the extent that Congress legitimately entered a
constitutionally designated federal area through the exercise of an
appropriately delegated legislative power, federal courts had no authority to
disregard state law or, let alone, to create federal law. The Rules of Decision
Act74 added authority to this conclusion. Erie created no chaos because the
existing state rules were presently available for application by federal judges in
diversity cases. State law filled the breach created by the extinction of the
preexisting federal common law. The same kinds of cases that were tried in
federal courts under diversity jurisdiction were also tried in state courts. That
the parties to a lawsuit are diverse and may opt for a federal court are merely
fortuitous factors. Prior to Erie, the results reached by state courts in suits
between diverse parties were the same as those reached in identical disputes
between non-diverse parties. After Erie, federal courts were charged with
reaching the same result that would have been reached if the suit had been
heard in state court.
The constitutional dimension of Erie should also be understood in the
context of the text of the Rules of Decision Act. In so doing, under the original
wording of the Act, there should remain no tension between Erie and the
general maritime law. The original Act obligated federal courts to apply state
law in “trials at common law.”75 An admiralty action brought in federal court
under Title 28, § 1333 of the United States Code was not regarded as an action
at common law. Thus, it was not subject to either the language or spirit of the
Act.76
7. The framers of the Constitution included diversity cases within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts because of their interest in the status of the
parties, not because of an interest in the substance of their disputes. The
framers of the Constitution included admiralty and maritime cases within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts precisely because of their subject matter. At
the very least, it is unquestionable that Article III of the Constitution grants
jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases to the federal judiciary. But,
does it make sense to limit the admiralty clause to nothing more than a key into
74. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.
75. Id.
76. See Gutoff, supra note 68, at 27-30, 52-53.
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federal court? Consider that Article III also includes diversity jurisdiction,
which embraces suits between citizens of different states and between aliens
and United States citizens. Subject to congressional implementation, a federal
forum would be available under diversity jurisdiction to many cases that might
otherwise qualify as being within admiralty jurisdiction. It is unlikely that the
admiralty provision was inserted simply to open the federal courts to private
maritime disputes between citizens of the same state. Likewise, Article III
includes federal question jurisdiction, which encompasses claims arising under
federal statutes. Subject to congressional implementation, public law admiralty
cases such as prize and revenue cases, and cases involving crimes on the high
seas, could have been entertained in federal court, as they were likely to arise
under federal law.77 It is once again submitted that the admiralty jurisdiction
provision was intended to confer more than mere access to the federal courts.
8. Critics of the general maritime law should take into account the various
ways in which “maritime law,” in its broad sense, accommodates the interests
of federalism. As heretofore articulated, limits on admiralty jurisdiction in the
contractual realm leave certain matters to state law, such as contracts to
construct ships and contracts for the sale of ships. State law also applies to
certain preliminary contracts deemed to be non-maritime.78 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged in several recent cases that,
notwithstanding the presence of admiralty jurisdiction, federal law does not
always preempt state law. For example, in Yamaha, the Court stated:
The federal cast of admiralty law, we have observed, means that “state law
must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court
finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the
States a wide scope.” Our precedent does not precisely delineate that scope. As
we recently acknowledged, “[i]t would be idle to pretend that the line
separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily
discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence.” We attempt no grand synthesis or
reconciliation of our precedent today, but confine our inquiry to the modest
question whether it was Moragne’s design to terminate recourse to state
remedies when nonseafarers meet death in territorial waters. 79

77. Although the general federal question jurisdiction provision now contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 was not part of the original Judiciary Act, Congress supplied specific jurisdictional grants
applicable to piracy, customs matters, etc. For example, the first Judiciary Act conferred
jurisdiction in the district courts over crimes and offenses within the respective districts and on
the high seas. 1 Stat. § 9, Chapter 8 of that legislation made piracy a crime. The first Judiciary
Act also conferred jurisdiction in the district courts over all suits for penalties and forfeitures
under the laws of the United States. Chapter 35 of that legislation set up an elaborate system of
customs regulations providing various forfeitures and penalties for violations thereof.
78. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at 26-28.
79. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
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The Court later states:
The Third Circuit left for initial consideration by the District Court the
question whether Pennsylvania’s wrongful-death remedies or Puerto Rico’s
applied. The Court of Appeals also left open, as do we, the source—federal or
state—of the standards governing liability, as distinguished from the rules on
remedies. We thus reserve for another day reconciliation of the maritime
personal injury decisions that rejected state substantive liability standards, and
the maritime wrongful-death cases in which state law has held sway.80

Subsequently, in Grubart, the Court explained the complexity of
substantive maritime law:
[E]xercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction does not result in automatic
displacement of state law. It is true that, “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes
the application of substantive admiralty law.” But, to characterize that law, as
the city apparently does, as “federal rules of decision,” is “a destructive
oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the
National Government in their regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that
state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this
Court finds inroads on a harmonious system. But this limitation still leaves the
States a wide scope.” (“Drawn from state and federal sources, the general
maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of
those rules, and newly created rules.”) Thus, the city’s proposal to synchronize
the jurisdictional enquiry with the test for determining the applicable
substantive law would discard a fundamental feature of admiralty law, that
federal admiralty courts sometimes do apply state law.81

On occasion, state tort remedies have been used to supplement maritime
law, notably in the wrongful death area.82
In implementing the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by
Article III, Congress has reserved an important role for state courts through the
“saving to suitors” clause. As interpreted, this provision enables state courts to
hear the vast majority of cases that otherwise could be brought in federal court
under admiralty jurisdiction. With limited exceptions, the savings to suitors
proviso permits a plaintiff to opt for a state forum. Dictum in Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co.83 has had the effect of limiting removal
of “admiralty” cases from state court, reinforcing the role of state courts in
removal cases. Furthermore, there are exceptions to the general rule that cases
brought in state court under saving to suitors are nevertheless governed by

80. Id. at 216 n.14 (internal citations omitted).
81. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 545-46 (internal citations omitted).
82. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215-16; Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d at 637
(construing U.S. CONST. art. III §2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1333). See generally id. (supplementing
admiralty law by applying a state strict liability remedy in maritime personal injury case).
83. 358 U.S. 354, 363 (1959).
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substantive maritime law,84 and it is customary for state courts to apply state
law in “savings” cases when it is consistent with federal admiralty law.85
The opportunity available to state courts to play a role in the development
of the general maritime law when adjudicating admiralty cases should not be
overlooked. For example, if a plaintiff exercises his or her right under saving to
suitors, then a state court, although bound by federal admiralty law, may be
forced to create an applicable rule of law in the absence of controlling
authority. Federal courts hold no monopoly in the business of creating general
maritime law, and state courts are bound only by the admiralty decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.86 This structure reflects the status of substantive
admiralty law at the time the Constitution was adopted. Federal and state
courts have developed a common body of rules. Although there are situations
where lower federal courts create rules of general maritime law, federal
preemption does not occur unless and until the United States Supreme Court so
declares. There is nothing to suggest that the Constitution or the framers
contemplated multiple systems or rules of admiralty law. For the reasons set
forth, I maintain that the general maritime law is constitutional and is an
appropriate subject of federal common law.
In light of the constitutional and federalism implications in the creation and
application of the general maritime law, it is not surprising that some of the
most controversial admiralty cases have dealt with the scope of admiralty
jurisdiction and its corresponding effect, preemption of state law. As to the
preemption issue, the interests of federalism demand a more flexible and
principled approach. The Supreme Court has failed to develop well-calibrated
rules delimiting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that sufficiently balance
national and local interests. In the same vein, the Court has failed to develop
conflicts of laws rules, which are particularly essential in cases which fall only
marginally within federal admiralty jurisdiction. This criticism is best
illustrated by the infamous, much maligned Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
case.87 In Jensen, the Court held that the family of a longshoreman who was
killed on a vessel in state waters could not recover benefits under a state
workers’ compensation scheme. If Congress had enacted legislation
prohibiting state workers’ compensation benefits for maritime workers, or, if
Congress had provided its own remedy for maritime workers, there would have
been a direct conflict between federal and state law, especially if the
congressional remedy was more generous. Under these circumstances, the

84. Green, 593 So. 2d 634, 637 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992).
85. Id.
86. Green, 593 So. 2d at 638 (citing Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc., 488 So. 2d 679, 681
(1986)).
87. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The holding in Jensen has been superceded by statute. See
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Court’s decision would have been correct. Even in the absence of
congressional legislation, if the Supreme Court had created special remedies
for injured maritime workers that were not available under state law, there
would have been a conflict. If the judicially created remedy was more
generous, then such a conflict might have justified the result. But in the Jensen
situation, the state law filled a gap in maritime law by providing a remedy
where none existed, either in the federal statute or in the general maritime law.
Thus, the majority of the Court used the absence of a statutory or general
maritime law remedy (a negative law, if there is such a thing) to preempt the
state law.88
Several factors undermine the Court’s decision. First, the majority opinion
does not sufficiently value the significance of the state’s interest in enacting its
workers’ compensation statute. The statute was general legislation, covering
thousands of workers in the state. This legislation did not single out or
discriminate against the maritime industry. It was a state’s attempt to protect its
labor force and their families. The majority opinion undervalues the significant
state interest in being able to pass on to employers the costs of personal injury
and death generated by their industries. The majority opinion overlooks the
financial impact on the state, which otherwise must bear the financial burden
of providing for disabled employees and their families in case of work related
injuries and death.
Second, the opinion ignores the relationship between the state and the
decedent longshoreman. The “covered” longshore workers were local residents
of the state. They lived and worked within the state. In contrast to seamen, they
were essentially a non-mobile work force.
Third, the majority opinion glosses over the land-based dimension of
longshore work. Not only do longshoremen live on the land, they also perform
a substantial amount of their work on the land. They are engaged in a type of
maritime employment where national interests and local interests converge. In
such situations, local interests should be accorded more weight in resolving the
preemption issue. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, if the decedent
had been killed moments after having left the ship, maritime law would not
have applied at all. His family would have had no remedy under maritime law.
Even though he was engaged in maritime employment, they could not have
satisfied the maritime locus test required to establish maritime tort jurisdiction.
Moreover, unlike seamen, who have long been the beneficiaries of
protective congressional legislation and who have been deemed to be wards of
the court, longshoremen and other land-based maritime workers, including ship
builders and repairers, had to look to the states for protection. The state’s goal
in Jensen, compensation of injured land-based maritime workers, also
implicates national concerns. Either Congress, or perhaps even the courts,
88. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217.
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could have created adequate remedies for workers injured or killed on the job;
they did not. Yet, there was also a sufficiently important and strong state
interest that justified state intervention in the absence of conflicting federal
remedies. It is precisely in such situations that accommodation is required. If
Congress later decided to enact comprehensive legislation that was national in
scope, that would have been the time to consider preemption.
The Jensen majority concluded that state law could not be applied to a case
otherwise subject to maritime jurisdiction if the state law either “contravenes
the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and
interstate relations.”89 It opined that Congress could enact such a law, which
would apply uniformly throughout the country. But in fact, there was no
contrary act of Congress. Still, the Court construed the absence of
congressional legislation with the same force it would give to legislation that
conflicted with state law. The state law was invalid not because it conflicted
with an act of Congress, but because there was no act of Congress. In other
words, it violated negative legislation, that is, it violated no law.
The majority opinion does not otherwise indicate in what respect the
exemption of employers from liability to injured workers was a characteristic
feature of the general maritime law. To the contrary, injured seamen could
recover “workers’ compensation” benefits from their employers in the form of
the judicially created remedy of maintenance and cure.90 Like maintenance and
cure, workers’ compensation is not based on employer fault, so the imposition
of liability without fault was not in itself antithetical to the characteristics of
the general maritime law.
Instead of looking at the importance of the local interest, it focused on the
importance of uniformity, i.e., uniformly imposing on longshoremen the risks
of their employment. The Court simply omitted consideration of the local
interest and punted the problem to Congress. Instead of reasoning that the lack
of congressional action may have been prompted by an intent to leave matters
to the states, that is, deferring to congressional wisdom that a state workers’
compensation scheme which included shore-based workers was preferable to a
federal compensation remedy or to no remedy at all, the Jensen majority
essentially ignored Congress. In fact, we know from hindsight that the Court
ultimately compelled Congress to enact legislation providing maritime workers
with a compensation remedy that indisputably Congress believed should have

89. Id. at 216.
90. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (reiterating seaman’s right to maintenance and
cure).
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been provided by state law and subject to state control.91 A bad decision by the
Court in a case such as Jensen, however, should not undermine the concept of
“the general maritime law” and the important role that it plays. When
discussing Jensen, it is important to consider that no subsequent decision since
Jensen and its progeny has taken such an extreme view on preemption. As a
matter of fact, in another controversial decision that has been subject to much
criticism by admiralty lawyers, Wilburn Boat, the Supreme Court refused to
preempt state law.92
In the author’s opinion, a distinction should be made between state law that
purports to negate or diminish rights under federal maritime law and state law
that fills in gaps or supplements federal maritime law. The state workers’
compensation scheme accomplished both. Such legislation should not be
preempted in the absence of an overwhelming need for uniformity, which is
difficult to conceive of in the area of personal injury or death. Even where
Congress has acted, supplemental or complementary state law is not invariably
preempted. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the LHWCA does
not preempt state worker’s compensation laws in situations where maritime
workers covered by the federal statute are injured on land.93 Should a state
statute, however, purport to diminish remedies created under the general
maritime law, preemption would be appropriate.
A major problem with Jensen is that the criteria articulated in the opinion
are simply not useful. In Miller v. American Dredging,94 for example, the
majority pays lip service to the Jensen test, but ultimately finds the
substantive-procedural dichotomy more helpful. In other words, it was easier
for the Court to uphold the Louisiana forum non conveniens statute by
classifying it as procedural, holding that procedural rules were not outcomedeterminative. The same substantive law would apply regardless of the forum
in which the case was adjudicated.
In a step in the right direction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has tried to refine the Jensen test into more workable criteria.95 As stated by the
court:
(1) “state law is not preempted when it contains a detailed scheme to fill a
gap in maritime law”96;
(2) “state law is not preempted when the law regulates behavior in which
the state has an especially strong interest”97;
91. Compare Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980) with Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
92. 348 U.S. 310 (1955), reh’g denied, 249 U.S. 907 (1955).
93. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 723-24.
94. 506 U.S. 809 (1992).
95. Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1987), rev’d. 486 U.S.
140 (1988).
96. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d at 317.
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(3) “maritime law preempts [state law] whenever a uniform rule will
facilitate maritime commerce, or, conversely, when non-uniform regulation
will work a material disadvantage to commercial actors”98;
(4) “maritime law preempts state law when the state law impinges upon
international or interstate relations”99;
(5) the final factor, which the court admitted to be stated “badly” is “that
plaintiff should win personal injury or death maritime tort claims.”100
While far from perfect, this approach lends itself more towards balancing
state interests with the interests that ultimately underlie the need for federal
maritime law.
The author believes that the critics of the general maritime law should
both examine more closely the many ways in which maritime law
accommodates federalism and restudy the post-Jensen decisions which are
more sensitive to state law. It would probably be more fruitful to help fine-tune
jurisdictional criteria and the rules for resolving conflicts between federal and
state law. For example, is it really necessary to exercise jurisdiction over and
apply federal law in incidents involving pleasure boats in waters that are used
solely for recreational purposes merely because such waters might sustain
commerce? Should not the Supreme Court develop more workable choice of
law rules in deciding whether admiralty courts should apply state law where
state interests are important and there is no corresponding benefit to national
interests? This is where I believe the focus should be and I am not alone.101

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
(1998).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id.
See Michael F. Sturley, Was Preble Stolz Right?, 29 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 317, 331

